Administrative discretion and representative

bureaucracy: Linking descriptive representation

to substantive pepresentation by Mohamed, Ahmad Martadha
Administrative Discretion and Representative 
Bureaucracy: Linking Descriptive Representation 
to Substantive Representation 
Ahmad Martadha Mohamedl 
Much has been said about the public service lately Most ofthe time, rhe 
opinions tend to be negative. WmeW, inefficient, atarrogmtf unresponsive, 
impersonal, autocratic, and mdemocmtic are amo% the harsher miticisms 
thrown at the bureaucracy. Yet, despite thse criticisms, the publicsemice plays 
wentia roles inimplemen&g and enforcing government policies. hfknypeople 
whose lives have been affected by government agencies though a wiq af 
poLicies in areas such as income redistribution, environmental protection, crime 
prevenfion, and health m e  management realize the importance of those 
agencies. Howevet, when government becomes too big and too puw&l, it 
poses a thrwt to demo-. Thus, when Kingsley (1344) started to argue that 
the civil service needed to b e q m t a t i v e i n  order to be responsive,he basically 
introduced a new concept of representation that was previously a domain in 
the study of political systems. Ewr since his conception of *representative 
bwea~cracy,"~ a plethora of scholaps and praaitioners has argued the need for 
a diverse buremcraticvuorkbrce thatreflects thepop~~latianit s e w .  According 
to these scholars, rqrwntative bureaucracy enhances its legitimacy in a 
demouatic political system. 
A shift in philosophy From avoidance to meptance of the d t y  rhat 
bureaucracy would continue to gencrate power in the policy-making process 
fostered the demand for a more representative bureaucracy. Rdurke 0978) 
contends that dthough a powerful buteaucracy threatens the "traditional 
freedoms of democratic society the bureaucratic power can be used to protect 
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and extend those freedoms."The ideaof representative bureaucracy was further 
highlighted by Macii (1971), who points om that "we were wninded of 
relevance, social problems, personal mo&y,  innovation, diems, the evils of 
hierarchy and bureaucracy." In other words, bureaucracy has power and thus 
needs to be included in the scheme of represenration and social justice. 
Representative bureaucracy has now become &ential in ademomtic political 
system. Riggs (1970) assem that representation in a l l  forms of government is 
critical to the stability of that government. He points to the rise of public 
rebellion invaxiom countries as a consequence ofthe Wure to have an equitable 
representadon in the political dimensions o fgonmen t  and its adminismation. 
He maintains that there is a 'need for diverse elements in a population to be 
adequateIyrepresented in order for a pvernment to command their loyalty as 
a legitimate expression of common welfaree (1970: 570). 
The concept of atfirmarive action in the bureaucracy is essentially an 
attempt to broaden the social composition of the bureaucracy to rdect that of 
the whole population, especially from cenain underrepresented groups such 
as women and African Americans (Kern* and Siegel 1989). The idea that 
a diverse wokforce will better enhance customers' demands is also gaining 
momentum in the private sector. Kiel (1994) believes that an organizxion 
that is rdeaive ofits population will have a better understanding of its dients' 
needs. Sin&rl)r, Dresang (1374) agrees that an organization that mirrors soday 
allows it to serve as % index of openness and access." Furthermore, a large 
number of private organizations have considmed employment diversity to be a 
good business strategy (Howes 1993). Howes a p e s  that &mative action 
has now become a prerequisite for future success or even survival for any 
orpization. 
Buildi% upon this foundation, I intend to explore this issue in greater 
detail, especially as it pertains to Malaysian buteducraq. The first patt of this 
article explores the theory of representative bureaucracy, highlighting previous 
empirical studies that explore the transition from descriptive representation to 
substantive representation in gwernment agencies. The w o n d  part explores 
the concept of administrative discretion and highlights how individuals' 
perceptions of the discretion influence the formation of a representative role. 
The final section explores the hypothesis that individual administrators who 
perceive themselves as advocators of cenain groups prefer policy outcomes 
that are more tesponsive to the interests of women and minorities than those 
of their colleagues. 
Admimvarive Discrsoon and Reprwnedve Bureauc~a~  75 
II. The Theory of fipresen~tke Bureaucracy 
A general consensus maintains that the mere existence of various 
insdtutions ofpublic accountability is not enough; they have to be dfective in 
procecringthe interests of the public. This is because the qualityofgo~mance 
is determined not by the objective perqtions ofa few experts but by the net 
impact of g o v e r m t  policies on the d - b e i n g  of its citizens (Shah 1996; 
H d e r  andShah 1998). The quality ofgovernance is thus enhanced by dosely 
matching government services with citizen preferences, as well as by moving 
governmentdosa to the people it is supposed m serve, somethingzbat ensures 
grater accountability of the public service. In recent years concecn has 
proliferated about the consequences of governance and misgovernance 
(Kaufman, b y Y  and Zoido-Lobaton 1999). For soample, a few empirical 
studies have demonstrated the link between accounrability and performance. 
Wade (1994) finds that when irription officials in India and Korea face more 
l o 4  pressure, they tend to perform better than traditional arrangements that 
insulate them h m  political pressure. Inaddition, Isham, Naray", andPritchett 
(1995) reveal that aid-financed rural warer supply projects performed much 
better with greater participation from their beneficiaries. A wealth of cross- , 
country indicarors of various aspecm ofgovernance now strongly suggests that ' 
good gwemance itnprwes government accountability to d t k n s  and enhances I 
the quality of publicservices (Kaufmann, b y ,  and Zoid~Lobaton 20003. 
These concerns have certainly renewed interest in protecting democratic 
values as they pertain to control of gwernmentagenciea The growth of public 
qencies has forced theorists andpracritioners to revisit bureaucratic paradigms 
I 
such as fairness, repreentation, participation, accountabilitg, responsiveness, I 
political neutrality, efficiency, tationality5 and exwise. Yet, thevery natute of 
publie administration poses problems to accommodating these values. Fog 1 
example, bureaucracy consists of appainted officials and has a tendency 
to rely on expertise and knowledgq over accountability5 participation, and 
daocratic control Weber 1968; bfosher 1968). In addition, .bureaucrats' 
lack of accountabilityat the ballot box, as well as various civil &ce regulations 
1 
that insulate them from political pressure, further compound the fear that , bmeauuatic power comes at the apense of public interest (Eislov and 
Rosenbloom 1981). 
Hmce, the essence of traditional public administration that tends to be I 
rigid, rule-bound, centralized-insular, self-protective, and profoundly 
antidemocratic has often collided with the contemporary paradigm of 
bureaucracy that "allows qualifiedvoters an efficient instrument throughwhich 
the of the people may be expressed; makes oficers both responsive and 
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question in the field of public administration is whether or not these 
bureaucratic characteristics are legitimate in terms of democraticprinciples. In 
this regard, David Rosenbloom (1993) opines that the legitimacy of bureauaacy 
occurs when bureaucratic policy making is subject to direct popular control. If 
bureaucracy is isolated from public accountability, then bureaucracy can in no 
way be responsive to public interests and desires. As a result, we are facedwith 
the persistent problem of bow best to ensure bureaucratic responsiveness and 
accountabiliq to the public. 
Representative theory initially emerged during the Greek civilization. 
Aristotle first mentioned the importance of representation of different classes 
ofsocietyin government (Vietri 1981). BookIII ofthe Polrtia is always regarded 
as the foundation of political science in the West. Thepolir, the supreme form 
of community for Aristotle, is the best community, because it enables rational 
men to participate in the political process. However, Aristotle also believes 
that dass conflict between the rich and the poor is inevitable in all societies. 
This conflict always poses a threat of instability, violence, and revolution. Hence, 
blending the class interests in government by supporting political equality 
avoids conflicts and at the same time increases legitimate sovereign authority. 
The writings of Karl Marx and Max Weber also contribute to the 
development of representative bureaucracy. The elimination of class-biased 
bureaucracy and the emergence of classless administrative systems came about 
because of Manis fear of the danger of dominant bureaucracy. Liewise, Weber's 
rational-legal approach allowed unrepresented groups to seek access to 
government. For example, the procedures of merit-based appointment increased 
the democratic potential of 311 groups to join the civil service (Ktislov 1967). 
However, the contemporary intellectual roots of the idea of representative 
bureaucracy can be traced to J. Donald Kingsley, Kingsley's comprehensive 
analysis of the British civil service revealed a pattern of administrative 
arrangements that reflected the character of the social structure of the nation. 
In his view, because the middle class dominated Br~tish society, it was inevitable 
that the composition of the bureaucracywas largely middle dass (Kingsley 1944). 
Since Kingsley's discovery of the term, the concept of representative 
bureaucracy has been widely interpreted and debated. David b ~ t h a n  (1946) 
was the first to propose that representative bureaucracy be integrated into the 
American civil service. He contended that representative bureaucracy could 
act as an internal control on the behaviors of administrators and hence could 
promote democratic values. Following Levithan, Long (1952: 813) espoused 
a more extreme form of representative bureaucracy. He suggested that 
Given theaeem~inevirabbpwrh in the power of the bureauuq dueugh 
d m i & ~ ~ a t I v ~  discretion asd sdminisrative kw, ir is vf uiucd impo-ce 
that rhe bureauuav be bod, repcesemative and demsradc in mmposiuon 
and ethas. 
In essence, Long bdievedthat a representative bureaumq &ced the 
democratization of the American civil service by promocine the inreresm and 
demands of the people it represented. ~uildiniupon this';heory, van Riper 
(15158) "gued that an 'open public sentice" was necessacy so chat the American 
puhlic service consisted of a reasonable cross-section of the population by 
occupation, class, and geography. To create a representative bureaucracy, he 
argued, government should accelerate the u p w d  mobility of women and 
minority admlnisuaors through an eqdoppormnity system. H e w  basic& 
the first American scholar to emphasiz s o d  chasactesistics as part of the 
representarive concept. Meanwhile, Subramatlim (1967) s-d that 
repmenrative bureaucracy is an orgmization 'in which every economic cIm, 
caste, region, or religion in a counay is represented in exact proportion to its 
number in the popdation." Kriilov (1967, 1974) also argued that American 
bureaucracy should be represenwive in its s o d  composition. He posited 
several advantages of having a diverse workbrce: 
The most obvious is the simple rep~sentational norion that dl soaal p u p s  
have a right to polirical pardciption and to influence. The second one can ho 
kbekdthefunctionalaspeccthewider themgeoftalcnm, typ% andmgioual 
md family m n t m  found irr a bureaucracy, rhe more likely ic is m be aMe to 
fulfill its funnions, with mpm to both i r m r a l  e%idcnq and s o d  5enhg. 
Bureaucrada alee symbolize d u e s  and power realities and are thus 
qxsentational in both a polidcal md an analanalyuc sense. Therefore, fioany 
4 mmluPandfutupeMf m mciqmay be chaneeledatdmu1mpi 
hmu%h the mere wnsdtutiun ofthe bueaucrq (1974: 64). 
However, even afier 2 decades dwing which representative bureaucracy 
became a concept of considerable impormce as an esplanatory roo1 in the 
discussions of the American civil service, its cancepn, meaniqp, and 
applicability remained ambiguous and underdeveloped. As a re.sdc of this 
confusion, Masher (1968: 1 ~ 1 5 )  attempted t6 darify the concept of 
represenntiveness by inmducing &epassive m d  adve form ofreprsentation. 
Masher advocated the fotm of passive representation because 
NRPSIPAG 
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the passive (or dwcriprive) meaning of iepracntativcness concerns the origins 
of indiidualsandrhe degree to which, mllenively, they mirror thewholesociety 
It may be sratistically measured in terns of locality or origin.. . and its nature 
(rural, urban, suburban), previous oapatiohs, father's occupation, education, 
family income, family social class, s e ~  race, religion. A public service.. . which 
is broadly represenrarive of all categories of the population in these respem, 
may be thought of as satisfying Lincoln's prescriptim of government "by the 
people" in a limited sense. 
Mosher befieved that passive representation was important because it 
signified democratic values such as open service, equal opportunity, social 
mobility, and participatory management. Kranz (1976) further expanded the 
concept of representation by emphasizing the idea of proportional 
representation. For example, he pointed out that a bureaucracy is representative 
if the ratio of apanicular group in an agency equals that of the group's percentage 
in the population. He argued that a representative bureaucracywas desirable 
for economic, social, and political justifications in such a way that bureaucracy 
was not only providing essential services but also was becoming a source of 
jobs, as well as "a potential form of significant group representation" (Kranz 
1976: 135). He reiterated that the public sector was the preferred avenue for 
women and minority grievances, since it offered them greater employment 
opportunities. 
Thompson (1976) illustrated three different forms of bureaucratic 
representation that could increase bureaucratic responsiveness to particular 
groups and advocate their interests in the policy outputs. First, he underlined 
the importance of demographic representation in the civil senice, which would 
reflect certain characteristics of the population, Secondly, he emphasized the 
attitudinal representation in which citizens' values and beliefs must be 
proportionately represented among public administrators. Finally, he argued 
for substantive representation, such that the actual behavior of bureaucrats 
should benefit intended social groups. In addition, Krislov and Rosenbloom 
(1981) were interested in integrating bureaucratic power into democratic 
government. In a similar manner to Thompson's, they also proposed three 
types of representation: representation by personnel (diverse workforce), 
representation by agencies (agencies promote specific groups' interests), and 
representation through citizen participation (citizens have greater access to 
decision-making processes). These representation models have indeed been 
part of administrative reforms aimed at increasing greater accountabil~ty and 
responsiveness. In short, the different versions of representation clearly 
emphasize the new perspective of the role of representative bureaucracywithin 
the context of democratic theory 
A representah bureaucracy that broadly r&ms the values, interests, 
aspiratioll~, and desires of the general public has a legidmare position in a 
democratic counuy. Administrators who wme from various demographic 
backgrounds will inidally be much more sensitive to the issues and kmrests of 
their own groups and thus be able to make policy decisions rhat reflect chose 
intern. how we^ individual ~ t r a t o r s  n o d y  go through sociahation 
processes that influence their values, beliefs, anitudep, and beha~ioxs. These 
socialition experiences in turn shape the way they perceive their work role 
as well as their policy decisions. Thus, d i h e n t  soci&tion experiences will 
different perceptions ofwork roles and &rent bureaucraticdecisiom. 
This meam that admkkrrators who first come into the civil servicewith s p d c  
valrtes and beliefs might not be abie to hold on to those values and beliefs 
anymore. The o ~ t i o n d  values and beliefs wiU now be more likely to 
shape their attimdes and behavior. Figure 1 illustrates the conception of 
representative bureaucracy that underlines this logic. 
Figure I, Bask Conception of Representathe Bureaucracy 
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III. Administrative Discretion and Repfeaentative Buceaucpwy 1 
The essential role of government bureaucracy in formulating and 
implementing public policies makes it acentral player in a democratic nation. 
Bureaucratic actions basically mnstimte what government chooses to do or 
not to do. The original politicsIadmhistration dichotomy has dearly kded 
because of the increasing importance of civil smant~ in the ~olicy-making 
processes. Scholars of public administration have long recognized that 
bureaucracy has now become the center of political power and authority. It 
has a direct impact upon the population because of its role in the decision- a 
makingand implementation pocesses (Weber 1968; Peters 1988;Thompson i 
1961; Lenin 19@; Kingsley 1944; Herring 1936;Appleby 1949; Wright 1974- 
7'5; Sutherland 1993; Kaufiuan 1954,1978; Frie&ch 1978; Finer 1978). 
However, the degree of administrative discretion required to implement 
publicpolicy stands in stark m n m r  to the d e m o d c g o v e m m t  requirement 
of sovereignty. As a rresult, the delegation of policy-making authority 
to government agendes raises a serious dilemma in democratic socieeries. On 
the one hand, bureaucratic discretion is essential because lawmakers cannot 
foresee all posaible circumstances surrounding the application and execution 
of public laws. On the other hand, their lack af accounrability to political 
pressure further constrains the ability of legdaslatutes to control bureaucratic 
behavior (Meier 1993a; Mosher 1982; Redford 1969; Ripley and F r d n  
199 1; Rourke 1992). Consequently, burwuww are often called upon u, make 
judgments based on their experiences, expertise, and intuition, rather than in 
the interest of the public (Warmsley et al. 1990). 
In addition, a serious concern arises that certain agencies of government 
seem to develop a special relationship with special private interests, the very 
interests they are supposed to regulate, again suggesting the inability of public 
agencies to ensue bureaucratic responsiveness and accountability so rhe public 
b w i  (1969) argues that the exercise of discretion rends to neglect the larger 
public interest. As a result, he pr~poses a Suridical demouacj' thch & 
derailed IegisJativeacdDn designed to eliminate discredon. In addidon to specific 
legislation and greater legislative review of administrative actions, other 
proposals have suggested increasing public accountability. Cooper (1982) 
discusesvarious roles, obhgations, and objectiweresponsibilities that limit the 
boundaries of administrative actions. Gawthrop's (1984) system theory is a 
mechanism used to redesign organizational structures to achieve bureaucratic 
responsiveness. Ziegler and Tucker (19781 argue that efficiency and 
responsiveness can only be maintained when policy initiative rests with the 
elected representative. Furthermore, econornim-based approaches have also 
contributed to the search for democratic accountability. The principal-agent 
,odd rhat is widely used in economics, managemenr, and sociology (Lcvindrd 
1988; Zuckcr 1987) has hrcomc a pc~crful new tool fi,r assrcsirig bureaucratic 
responsiveness. This model stipulates that the principals (cxcsudve and 
Iceislativc) design incentives and sancdons to control administrators' behavior 
rnu&at the behavior is. always in ~)-~wieh the policy pdkences of the 
(Wood and Waterman 1993). 
finer (1972) has also argued for gsaeer legislative oontrol and bcmsed 
+q&ion of admini~tdve aubide~as ameans oFconuohg bupeaucratr. 
&ng that bureaueta@' +views became the domimc view of socie~y, he 
~ec~mmends that legislatures engage in W e d  supemision ofgovernment 
apcies. Recent theo~etid and empitidstudies ( F 4 o h n  md Shipan 1990; 
C-er 1996; Hamilton and Schmeder 1994; Wood and Waterman 1993, 
1994) &wall highliind theudizgion of mechanism such= adminisuarive 
~roeedures, appointmenrs, budgets, and oversight hearin9 to enhance 
bureaucratic respoNivett~ in public agencies. Other empi~ical studies even 
indimre that many pubIic adminimators believe that eleeted ofEdah should 
exercise some degree ofdominance wer them (Green 1982; Gruber 198;"). 
Finally, the graavi% influence of the democradc accountabii model 
on adminimtive thmriea brinp Forth tht argument for a representative 
biumucracg. Pcoponems of reptwmrative bureaucraq argue that bu~eancratic 
deckions dec t rhe  generalwill of the popdadon ifb~eaucratic omposition 
shares similar chaaaeristies of the population, snch as geographical locations 
(Denhatdt 1392), social classes @ingsIy I%), and raut or gender (Gisiov 
1970. VanRiper (1958) arguesthat the concept of representatiye-bureaucmq 
o f f e r s  psitiveperspectiveon the t h w ~ ~ ~ ~ e m p o n s i b ' c l i t y .  Others 
w e  that the repsesmsatiae nature pf bureaucrq m&es it potentially 
rerponsive eo the needs a d  brerests ofthe popuktion &eng 1952; Wer 
1993a: Sdmtein 19&fiS 1992). A bureitllaaq d w  cansim 05 people from 
dlvwsc b a c h u n d s  can certainly iduence @icy preferences to be in sync 
wieh the interests and demands ofthe group they represenr. 
II? Variabla in the Model 
The model forexaminimg the linkage between dguipriverepresentatian 
and substanrive representation is shown in F&e2. 
- 
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Figure 2. Relationship between Descriptive and Substantive Representation 
Favoring Women and 
Source: Author's researches. 
A. Stakeholders' Role Expectations 
The focus of this variable is to examme administrators' perceptions of 
what significant others perceive their role should be. With such a focus, the 
aim is to demonstrate that an administrator defines his or her role with reference 
to others. For example, role theorists infer that a certain behavior will follow a 
particular position. (For a further discussion of role theory, see Gross, Mason 
and McEachern 1958: 12; Conway and Feigert 1972: 124-125; and Linton 
1945.) Indiv~duals' attitudes are thus a reflection of the attitudes held by the 
group with which he or she associates. Michael Dawson (1994) calk this 
attachment being "one of us." He defines this notion of linked fate as the 
degree to which particular groups believe that their own self-interests are linked 
to the interests of others. As a result, the role itself is formed by the expectations 
of significant others and the expectation that the administrator attaches to it. 
For example, when administrators perceive that the community of minorities 
and women expect them to represent women's and minority interests, they are 
more likely to accept this role (Kahn et al.  1964). However, when an 
administrator perceives that other actors have different expectations of how he 
or she will behave in this position, the clash of ~ncompatible xpectations leads 
to role conflict. For Instance, political leaders expect the administrator to 
represent their interests and take sides on policy matters. On the other hand, 
the administrator also feels that his supervisors expect him to be neutral and 
efic~ent in carrying out his tasks. As a result of these different expectations, a 
public administrator often experiences intra-role conflict. It is generally true 
bat administrators may have to deal with outside actors in carrying out their 
duties? The role expectations of other actors may significantly alter 
administrators' own perceptions concerning work roles. Actors such as 
po)iticians, the general public, superiors, professional associations, women and 
minoritycoIIeagues, and women and the minority communiry possess different 
political agendas. Moscliely, the role expectations of these actors often do not 
coincide with the administrators' perceptions of organizational goals. 
As a result, administrators must find ways to reconcile these different 
expectations with their own goals and commitments. For example, ~ ~ t e f a ~ e  
on representative bureaucracy reveals that minority and women adminisrrators 
will often advocate policies that cater to the interests of their groups if other 
actors in the policy-makiug process hold such expenations for them. Likewk, 
administrators will tend m follow tadi t iod  bureaucratic roles ifthey perceive 
that orher actors expect &em to adhere to bureaucratic norms and practices 
(see Martinez [I9911 and Mumy er al. [1994]). Thus, adminirmrmn who 
perceive that 0 t h  impottant m o f s  in thepoIiLy environment q m  tkem to 
represent women5 and minorig i n m t s  are more like& m m m e  thp mh o f w m j  
and minoriv advocates a d  bent8 buve pol& prejrences that this mlt. 
8. Women and Minority Role Acceptance 
The perception of role orientations is cenrnl to this study. Selden (1997: 
117) defines roles as "sets of expected behaviors to be performed by a person 
occupying a particular position." (For futther discussion of tole orientations, 
please see Kahn, wolf% &inn, and ~n&[1964], T-ex [1956l, andwidmer 
[I9931 .) Role expectations are demands conveyed by significant others e x p d  , . -  * 
either formally or informally. However, these expectations are not as important 
as mdividuas' own perceptions ofwhar is expected of them (Kahn et al. 1964, 
Turner 1956). This is because accordihg to Kahn et al. (1964: 16), "It is the 
received role, however, which is the immediate influence on. .. behavior and 
the immediate source of.. . motivation to role performance." As a result, despite 
multiple role expectations, ; idmini tors  may ultimately decide which role 
orientations they will meet. 
Several scholars have examined organizational and environmental 
conditions that influence the rok orientations of public adminiitclcors 
(McClain and Karnig 1988, Henderson 1988, Martinez 1991, and Murray et 
' S e e ~ W e d a a x w n t o t h e ~ a n d ~ ~ ~ n f o & r a n g m d  Congress, 
the executive branch, and the pbllo, w+xeaallythe environmental groups, In Kaufman 1967. 
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al. 1994). Although the expectations vary from one significant actor to another, 
Selden (1 997) identifies two most common expectations: representative role 
orientation and traditional role orientation. The emphasis on the representative 
functions of bureaucracy- first Lodiked in the "new public administration" 
school of thought, which essentially dismisses the old Whonian tradition that 
public administration is a value-free practice (Waldo 1971; Marini 1971). 
The landmark Minnowbrook conference of public administration professionals 
in 1968 was the earliest indication that the voices for inclusion had started to 
gain promiqence in the administrative arena. Frederikson (1971), one ofthe 
proponents of this school, argues that bureaucracy has to be included in the 
scheme of representation and social justice. Similarly. Riggs (1970: 570) points 
out that there is a "need for diverse elements in a population to be adequately 
represented in order for a government to command their loyalty as a legitimate 
expression of common welfare." As a result, the idea of representative 
bureaucracy i s  not only to create a civil service that is more reflective of its 
population, but also to strive to make policies that promote the interests of 
h~storically disadvantaged groups such as women and minorities. Mosher's 
(1982) prescription for passive and active representation is reflective of his 
position that it is simply not enough to have a diverse workforce. Instead, 
public administrators should also advocate public policies that advance the 
interests and wishes of disadvantaged groups. Thus, when administrators 
perceive their role as advocates of women's or minority groups, they are more 
likely to pursue policy preferences that benefit women's and minority interests. 
Therefore, admzni$hatorr who assumethemk ofminonty andwomen+ rokadvoc& 
are Likely w pr$+rpolicies that advance the interest of women and minority groups. 
C. Traditional Role Acceptance 
The traditional bureaucratic roles emphasize economy, neutrality, 
rationalifj, meritocracy, and efficiency (Ingraham and Ban 1986). Traditional 
role orientation is based on the principle of merit and neutral competence. To 
this end, Kaufman (1956: 1,060) emphatically argues that public administrators 
need to "do the work of the government expertly, and to do it according to 
explicit, objecuve standards rather than personal or party or other obligations 
and loyalties." While neutral competence is important, the ultimate objective 
is efficiency in administration (Denhardt and deLeon 1993). Dahl (1947: 2) 
concurs that, "the doctrine of efficiencyruns like a half-visible thread through 
the fabric of public administration literature as a dominant goal." Similarly, 
Frederickson (1971: 311) asserts that the classic definition of public 
administration has always been "the efficient, economical, and coordmated" 
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deliverp of public services. More semt observations of public adminisnation 
also underline the ha tbat mnomy and &ciency cwntinue LO rrmain tbe cenrtal 
values among public administrators (Ingraham andBan 1986). As a mule, it is 
believed that administratars who accept the traditional bureaucratic role 
orientation wilI be less inched to wnceive their role orientation representing 
any pard& group. Spedkally. &nkmn who mme wdn'oiid m k m  
not l&& jo q a g e  S behaviors tbarwpaort the inmsts &women slui~m&-s. 
D. Control Variables 
I also inch& twu mntrol variables in this model: the ethnic* and the 
gender of the adrninistxator. Since organizatimalsocialization experienm may 
lead administrators to accept representative role orientation, acontrol variable 
of ethnicity is induded to determine w h d e r  it has any effect on palicy 
preferences (Selden 1997; Selden et al. 1998). In addition, a control variable 
of gender is included because ~cholars emmining the role of women in 
government tend to argue thzt women administrators ofcenhave a "heightened 
a w n e s s  of kminist itsues [that] often gim[sl them a bmer fie1 for the 
problmswomen encounter, making themspecially adept at recognizing when 
policy soludons fa i l  to aou~unt for women's unique needs" (Dolan 2000: 514). 
Thus, i~ is r&nable to assume thac gender may have an dditional impact on 
adminisuators' policy preferences. 
A. The Research Setting 
The focus of the empirial research conducted in this artideis the f e d d  
ministries in Kuda Lumpur. Since the focal point of the reseaieh is the 
discretionary powet of bureaucracy, it was imperative that only higher civil 
aervants be selected. They 'ranged from officers in the managerial and 
professionaI group to top manage1al positions such as seaet&y general* 
undersecretaries, their deputies and assistants, and directors of departments. 
The selection of higher civil servants in the study aE8 resonat& with the 
agumentby Meier and Stwart (1992) tIiarpublicadminisuatorswho am the 
subjects of the analysis must first have a &gnificanramount of discretion in the 
decision-making procvs. Second, the decisions must have important 
implications for the groups being represented, and third, the administrators 
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can be associated directly with the decisions they make. Because these 
assumptions dearly fit the characteristics of higher civil servants, they are 
appropriately selected in this study. 
6. Data Collection 
Data for +is study were collected in Malaysia during October 2002 and 
July 2003. Two main sources were i) government documents, official reports, 
and national statistics data of Malaysia and ii) survey questionnaires4 from a 
sample of Malaysian higher civil servants from Group A (management and 
professional and upper management) drawn from 12 federal ministries: the 
Ministries of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, Women and Family 
Development, National Unity and Social Development, Youth and Sports, 
Agriculture, Transport, Works, Home Affairs, Primary Industry, Finance, 
Energy, Communications, and Multimedia and Human Resources. 
The survey was self-administered. I personally distributed the question- 
naires to a top-ranking civil servant m each ministry, who then randomly 
distributed the questionnaires to the officials in the ministry. I specified the 
time for collecting back the questionnaires and even extended the time when 
the responses were poor. All of the ministries I surveyed are located in Kuala 
Lumpur and Putrajaya. The number of questionnaires was distributed based 
upon the number of Group A officials, as well as the requested number from 
the relevant ministries. I distributed 545 questionnaires and recovered 205 
completed questionnaires, about 37%. 
C. Operationalization 
Table 1 displays the variables used in this model. The dependent miable - 
examined the policy preferences of administrators. Ordinary least squares 
regression is used to estimate the eq~at ion.~ 
Tncques l~~ma res lvern pretcsteo *I tnc ,n varsltl Utara Mala)s!a, S'nta*, Kedah. 4s ng 15 i n  verslty 
aamm#strdtors to examine lhetacc vat otq 01 tne ltcrns in lhc q.esllonna.re. The admln slrators were 
askcd lo mdlcatc ,ag.arscss in the qJccl.ons or IIISINNI)~S lndy were a m  aslea to osnllfy any 
q.rcstrons tnat *ere rrclovanl or mfscaong tu tho subjccl DcinQ nvcstigalRd The res-01s of tile 
Preles revenlea a tew tems i f 8  lhe qdes1,onneira that were vagLe. Tar example. tna #urn 'm nonN 
Has vagde anu tnoreiorc necded to oe more speclnc in dnscroing ~ f t  ch grouplccan oc categorized 
as minority. 
Using the variance-inflation factor, the author examinedme equation forthe possibility of collinearily 
and multicollinearity and found no significant problem. To determine whether hetemcedasticity was 
present, the author used the Breush-Pagan-Godfreytest.The author did not detect heretocedasticity 
in the equation (Pindyckand Rubinfeid 1998). 
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Table 1. Operationalization of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable: 
Policy Preferences (Index lscaled 0-80%) 
Independent Variables 
Trad~t~onal Role Acceptance (Index 2 scaled 040%)  
Women and Minority Role Acceptance (Index 3 scaled 040%) 
Stakeholder's role expectation (Index 4 scaled 040%) 
Racelethn~city: 
0 = Malays 
1 = Minor~ty 
Gender: 
1 = male 
2 =female 
Source: Author's researches 
D. Findings and Discussions 
Table 2 presents the results of the regression analysis for the dependent 
variable policy preferences benefiting women and minority groups. Overall, 
the variables induded in the model account for 34% of the vadation found in 
the policy preferences favoring women's and minority interests. Perhaps most 
crucial, administrators who perceive their role as that of an advocate ofwomen 
and minority interests are significantly more likely to prefer policy decisions 
that advance the interests of women and minorities (beta = .45). Second, 
although it does not attain statistical significance, the traditional role perception 
variable is related negatively to policy preferences favoring women and 
minorities, suggesting that acceptance of traditional role orientation does not 
further women's and minority interests. Third, as hypothesized, role expectation 
of other actors has a significant impact on policy preferences favoring women's 
and minority interests. The positive relationship between perceived role 
expectations and ~ol icy  references indicates that the more administrators 
perceive that other actors expect them to advocate women's and minority 
interests, the more likely it is that.they will choose policy decisions that benefit 
women's and minority interests. 
The control variables introduced into the model do not remove the 
significant influence of women's and minority representative role acceptance 
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and role expectations of other actors. Because administrators' perceptions of 
their roles have been shown to be influenced by organizational socialization, 
control variables were included to examine. whether differences in policy 
exist between minoriry administrators and Malay adminismm~s 
and between adminisuators of & ~ n t  (Selden 1997). The fin% 
indicate that even when gender and ethnidty are controlled stati~ticall~ 
perceived role expectations and the advocacy representative role accepted by 
adminisnatars affect administrators' policy preferences. 
Table 2. Regression Model for Policy Preference 
Unsfandardimd Standard Standardized 1 -. . .- - ~~~~~ ~~ 




Women and Minorily '0.4Ma 
Represeatatlve Role Acceptance 
Traditional Bureaucratic 
Role Acceptance 
St&eholdersl Role Expoolation 0.24la 
RP = ,341 
Adjusted RZ = ,324 
F = 20.563 
Number of Cases = 205 
^ significant at 0.05 
source: Authors 'srssearches 
w 
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VI. Conclusion 
The findings of this study further enhance the understanding of the 
concept of representative bureaucracy. Krislov (1974) was the first scholat to 
argue that exarninlng the descriptive representation alone was of limited 
usefulness. This is because descriptive characteristics of administrators offer 
little evidence that theywill represent the interests of peoplewho are of similar 
backgrounds. As such, the study to understand how descriptive representation 
can be translated into substantive representation becomes much more pertinent 
among representative bureaucracy scholars. By exploring the relationship 
between role perceptions and poIicy preferences, this study is able to provide 
evidence of the linkage between descriptive representation and substantive 
representation. Despite the importance of ethnicity to administrators' role 
perceptions and policy preferences, this study strongly suggests that 
administrators who perceive them role as advocates of women and minorities 
are more indined to prefer policy decisions that bendt women and the minority 
community. Most important, the research also suggests conditions that translate 
descriptive representation into substantive representauon. The data analyzed 
~ndicate that role expectations of others and role acceptance significantly 
influence the degree to which Malaysian administrators engage in substantive 
representation ofwomen's and minority interests. 
- 
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